CJ 510 Milestone Three Guidelines and Rubric

Overview: The final project in this course will expose you to a problem situation and task you with how it should be solved. You will imagine you are employed at a criminal justice organization facing a communal problem. Your superior at the organization has asked you to review the problem situation and offer your recommendations. You will be given the chance to evaluate the situation and develop suggestions that will inform development of strategies to address the issue using appropriate ethical and transparent leadership and communication skills.

The main purpose of this third milestone of your project is for you to work on your analysis of ethics. You will analyze your selected case study for the ethics that were used to address the problem. You will evaluate how leadership addressed the problem and whether they used ethical decision-making.

Prompt: Using your selected case study, complete the following critical elements for the assignment:

A. Determine the ethicality of leadership’s decision making in their attempts to address the problem. Be sure to justify your response and support your response with appropriate research from the field gathered in your previous review.

B. Evaluate the transparency of the organization in regard to public communications. Be sure to justify your response. For example, are systems in place to communicate with the public? Has the organization been readily available and willing to provide the community with information regarding the problem?

C. Evaluate how leadership of the organization considered the ethical concerns of the community in addressing the problem. Be sure to justify your response. For example, how were the concerns of internal and external stakeholders considered?

D. Determine how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the performance of employees in addressing the problem. How might these decisions improve employees’ ability to address the problem? How might they hinder their ability to address the problem?

E. Determine how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the culture of the organization. For example, what if employees do not agree with the decisions?

F. Explain the overall implications of the ethical decision-making of leadership and how that affects the organization and community. Be sure to justify your response, and support your response with appropriate research from the field gathered in your previous review.

Refer to the Criminal Justice Library Tips for support in finding and citing outside resources.

Rubric Guidelines for Submission: Your submission should be 2–3 pages, 12 point Times New Roman font, double-spaced, and follow APA formatting.

Please note that the grading rubric for the milestone submission is not identical to that of the final project. The Final Project Rubric will include an additional “Exemplary” category that provides guidance as to how you can go above and beyond “Proficient” in your final submission.

Critical Elements Proficient (100%) Needs Improvement (80%) Not Evident (0%) Value

Analysis of Ethics: Ethicality

Determines the ethicality of leadership’s decision making during their attempts to address the problem, justifying response and supporting response with appropriate research from the field

Determines the ethicality of leadership’s decision making during their attempts to address the problem, justifying response and supporting response with appropriate research from the field but determination is cursory, illogical, or there are gaps in the justification, or supporting research is inappropriate

Does not determine the ethicality of leadership’s decision making during their attempts to address the problem

15

Analysis of Ethics: Transparency

Evaluates the transparency of the organization in regard to public communications, justifying response

Evaluates the transparency of the organization in regard to public communications but evaluation is cursory, illogical, or there are gaps in the justification

Does not evaluate the transparency of the organization in regard to public communications

15

Analysis of Ethics: Ethical Concerns

Evaluates how leadership of the organization considered the ethical concerns of the community in addressing the problem, justifying response

Evaluates how leadership of the organization considered the ethical concerns of the community in addressing the problem, justifying response but evaluation is cursory, illogical, or there are gaps in the justification

Does not evaluate how leadership of the organization considered the ethical concerns of the community in addressing the problem

15

Analysis of Ethics: Performance

Determines how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the performance of employees in addressing the problem

Determines how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the performance of employees in addressing the problem, but determination is cursory or illogical

Does not determine how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the performance of employees in addressing the problem

15

Analysis of Ethics: Culture

Determines how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the culture of the organization

Determines how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the culture of the organization, but determination is cursory or illogical

Does not determine how the ethical decisions of leadership may impact the culture of the organization

15

Analysis of Ethics: Implications

Explains the overall implications of the ethical decision-making of leadership and how that affects the organization and the community, justifying response and supporting response with appropriate research from the field

Explains the overall implications of the ethical decision-making of leadership and how that affects the organization and the community, justifying response, but explanation is cursory, illogical, or there are gaps in the justification, or supporting research is inappropriate

Does not explain the overall implications of the ethical decision-making of leadership and how that affects the organization and the community

15

Articulation of Response Submission has no major errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, or organization

Submission has major errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, or organization that negatively impact readability and articulation of main ideas

Submission has critical errors related to citations, grammar, spelling, syntax, or organization that prevent understanding of ideas

10

Total 100%

KS1029

Case Number 1588.0

This case was written by Susan Rosegrant for Richard Falkenrath, Assistant Professor in Public Policy, and Arnold Howitt,

Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, for use at the Executive Session on Domestic

Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Funding was provided by the Office of Justice

Programs, US Department of Justice. (0800)

Copyright © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce

materials, call 617-495-9523, fax 617-495-8878, email [email protected], or write the Case Program Sales Office,

Kennedy School of Government, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. No part of this publication may be

reproduced, revised, translated, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any

means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the written permission of the Case Program

Sales Office at the Kennedy School of Government

The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots (C)

In many respects, it was not surprising that Governor Pete Wilson would offer the services of the

California National Guard to help quell the riots that had engulfed South Central Los Angeles. The Guard had

played a prominent role in responding to civil disturbances during the 1960s, with more than 13,000 troops

deployed during the Watts riots alone. As in other parts of the country, Guard troops had also been mobilized to

respond to anti-Vietnam protests and other student demonstrations in the 1960s and early 1970s.

But over the following two decades, federal and state support to fund National Guard preparedness for

civil disturbance responses had tailed off as law enforcement agencies’ need for military support seemed to lessen.

Beginning in 1989, staff officers from the Guard had attended a series of meetings with the state Office of

Emergency Services (OES) and other law enforcement groups, in part to discuss the National Guard role in mutual

aid. Based on the meetings, some officials at the National Guard headquarters concluded that the state’s improved

mutual aid system had largely negated the need for Guard troops to respond to civil unrest. As stated in the OES

Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, dated October 1991, “Normally, military support will be provided to local

jurisdictions only after a request is made by the chief executive of a city or county or sheriff of a county, and only

after the disturbance has been determined to be, or to likely become, beyond the capabilities of local law

enforcement forces, as supplemented by forces made available under the existing mutual aid agreements.” Under

the mutual aid plan, therefore, a police department such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) would first

call on the Sheriff’s Department and other local agencies before considering state or federal resources.

Based on these funding and priority changes, Guard forces slated to receive civil disturbance training were

cut from 10,000 to only 5,000, and, according to some observers, scant attention was paid to whether even that

number of troops were trained. As in the city of Los Angeles, most civil emergency preparedness focused on

natural disasters, and, in particular, earthquakes. Moreover, other activities took priority, such as military

preparedness for overseas operations—including the Gulf War in 1991—and the war on drugs. Nevertheless, notes

Richard Andrews, former OES director, although Guard officials may have believed that their future role in civil

disturbances would be limited to administrative or logistical support, Guard mission statements still clearly stated

the need to maintain readiness for a riot response (see Exhibit A for a list of key players involved in the civil

This document is authorized for use only by Destiny Nance in CJ-510-Q5073 Ethical Leadership-CJ 22TW5 at Southern New Hampshire University, 2022.

HKS Case Program 2 of 26 Case Number 1588.0

disturbance response). “Nobody would ever have told them there is no chance that this will ever happen again,”

Andrews declares.1

During the trial of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King, the Guard had received signals that

there could be serious trouble in Los Angeles. LAPD Commander Bayan Lewis had passed along his unofficial

warning of a possible disturbance, for example, and had borrowed more than 300 sets of helmets and flak vests. In

addition, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) had called about using the Los Alamitos Armed Forces Reserve Center

south of Los Angeles as a possible staging area in case of an outbreak. Still, because of the revised understanding of

its role, and the fact that there had been no official request from Los Angeles law enforcement agencies or OES to

be on alert, the state National Guard made no special preparations during the trial.

At about 8:30 p.m. on April 29, however, Wilson’s office called the Adjutant General of the California

National Guard, Major General Robert Thrasher, to let him know that the governor was considering calling up the

Guard (see Exhibit B for a chronology of events during the riots). A half hour later, at Mayor Bradley’s request, the

governor authorized the deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops to help restore order in Los Angeles. “As the

seriousness of the situation started to become evident, everybody recognized that putting the National Guard on

the street would send a very strong message,” says Richard Andrews. Thrasher quickly called Andrews, hoping to

learn more details about the Guard’s mission, but Andrews could only promise to check with the LAPD and the

Sheriff’s Department for more information.2 At 9:15, Thrasher ordered the troop mobilization. No specific time had

been set for soldiers to be on the streets, but Thrasher told the governor’s staff that troops would be “in their

armories” in about six hours.

At 10:13, Richard Andrews of OES arranged the first in what would be a series of conference calls, usually

including the same individuals: Governor Wilson, General Thrasher, Mayor Bradley, Sheriff Sherman Block, Police

Chief Daryl Gates, and CHP Commissioner Maurice Hannigan. The riots, according to Gates, had spread to an area

of about 45 to 50 square miles, and there were 400 to 500 police in the area. Sheriff Block also reported spreading

unrest, and what he described as a “Mardi Gras” like atmosphere in the streets in some areas of the county. 3

Nevertheless, neither Gates nor Block felt the National Guard was needed, although when pressed by the

governor, they endorsed the call-up. Both officials, however, welcomed the CHP’s offer of 1,500 officers, whom

they planned to use for tasks such as securing the perimeters of riot-torn areas. “The Highway Patrol was a very

highly professional, very disciplined organization,” says Andrews, “and not a territorial threat.”4

1 Richard Andrews interview with writer, March 27, 2000. Subsequent comments by Andrews are from the same interview. 2 Under the mutual aid system, when a local government requested assistance from the Guard, OES provided the mission

assignment. 3 Lt. Gen. William H. Harrison (US Army Ret.), Assessment of the Performance of the California National Guard During the

Civil Disturbances in Los Angeles, April & May 1992, Report to the Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor, State of California (Sacramento, CA: October 2, 1992), p. A-7.

4 The Sheriff’s Department earlier that evening had already asked for 50 CHP officers to help return prisoners who had escaped from an honor farm north of Los Angeles.

This document is authorized for use only by Destiny Nance in CJ-510-Q5073 Ethical Leadership-CJ 22TW5 at Southern New Hampshire University, 2022.

HKS Case Program 3 of 26 Case Number 1588.0

As it turned out, the CHP—one of whose missions was to assist local law enforcement—was well prepared

to take action. According to then Chief Edward Gomez, commander of the CHP’s Southern Division overseeing Los

Angeles County, the agency had taken the possibility of a disturbance seriously, and more than a month before the

trial ended had drafted a contingency plan, dubbed the Red Plan, that mandated different levels of response

depending on the extent of any unrest. A Level One response, for example, would commit as many as 400 of the

approximately 1,000 officers in the Southern Division to a disturbance; Level Two would draw in additional officers

from neighboring divisions; and Level Three would deploy officers from around the state.

Gomez initiated the Red Plan as soon as the judge in the Rodney King beating trial gave notice that the

verdicts would be announced in two hours. Along with his top officers, Gomez watched the verdicts being read,

then immediately called a tactical alert, which put officers on 12-hour shifts and alerted them to wear riot gear.

“You can’t get in trouble by having too many people ready and available,” Gomez asserts. “You can always de-

escalate and send them home if after six hours nothing happens.”5 Even before Gates and Block accepted the

officers, the Red Plan had moved to Level Three, and the CHP was ready to support local law enforcement in large

numbers as needed.

Other than accepting the CHP officers, though, Gates made almost no use of outside law enforcement

agencies in the first hours of the riot. During the conference call, Sheriff Block offered Gates 500 deputies, but—

reminiscent of the Watts riots experience—Gates refused the offer, preferring not to rely on his rival, and still

believing that the LAPD would regain control on its own. After Gates’s negative response, Block, as regional

coordinator of the mutual aid plan, turned down several offers of help from other area law enforcement agencies

during the tumultuous first night of rioting, assuming that Gates would not be interested. The only local police

forces tapped by the LAPD were the Rapid Transit District Police and the University of California-Los Angeles Police

Department, both forces with which the LAPD had had substantial interactions in the past.

Nor did the LAPD make good use of the CHP that first night. Although some officers were sent to escort

firefighters, about 120 CHP officers who had been available in Los Angeles since 9 p.m. watched television at their

headquarters all night because they were given nothing to do, and in the midst of the chaos, neither the sheriff’s

office nor the LAPD could immediately find tasks for the 1,500 officers CHP Commissioner Hannigan had offered.

Gates, meanwhile, spent much of the first night touring the streets of Los Angeles with a driver and aide, finally

reporting to the city’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 6:00 a.m. “Daryl was a very dedicated police officer,

but if he had two shortcomings, one was what many people would call arrogance, and the other was his absolute

unbridled belief that the LAPD could and would handle anything,” says former Los Angeles City Fire Chief Donald

Manning. “He couldn’t come to grips with the fact that his people couldn’t and weren’t handling the whole thing.”

5 Edward Gomez interview with writer, March 28, 2000. Subsequent comments by Gomez are from the same interview.

This document is authorized for use only by Destiny Nance in CJ-510-Q5073 Ethical Leadership-CJ 22TW5 at Southern New Hampshire University, 2022.

HKS Case Program 4 of 26 Case Number 1588.0

A Flawed Mobilization

The National Guard deployment began with many questions unanswered. Although the conference call

participants had agreed on a target time of 4:00 p.m. the next day for getting troops on the streets, no one had

declared which agency would coordinate the Guard’s involvement, decided what its missions would be, or

estimated how many more troops ultimately might be called. In addition, some of the officials involved, including

Sheriff Block and Police Chief Gates, felt the Guard had been called up prematurely. After all, says Sheriff’s

Lieutenant Dennis Beene, a team leader at the county Emergency Operations Center, “there were about 20,000

police officers and deputies in this county, looking at the LAPD, the deputies, and the other 46 city agencies. Had

we managed those resources properly, we would not have needed anybody from outside to deal with what we

had.”6 Nevertheless, with the riot spreading, and no evidence that the LAPD had the situation under control,

Mayor Bradley and Governor Wilson pushed forward on the Guard deployment.

The initial mobilization went well. The troops chosen for deployment—members of the 40th Infantry

Division (Mechanized) based near Los Angeles—responded quickly, and almost the entire contingent of 2,000

soldiers had reported to about ten armories in the city area by 4:00 a.m. Although the state Guard headquarters

apparently had not anticipated the mobilization, many individual soldiers who had been watching television felt it

likely that they would be