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S ociety does promise positive reinforcers for behavior it wants to encourage. Fears of failure. punishment, or disgrace are balanced by the prospect ofrewards for conformity, diligence,

inventiveness, and constructive involvement. Unfortunately, we discover evety day in the news media that rewards for operating outside the law can be even greater. As long as people can gain more money, power, and prestige by breaking laws-and not getting caught-than by remaining within the law, a legal system without punishment will remain unfeasible. To the extent that rewards for vice exceed those for virtue, vice will remain in spite of its risks.

Positive Reinforcement and the Law

Our legal tradition accepts misconduct and crime as inevitable, as human nature. Indeed, it is human nature. What else could it possibly be? But human nature is not etched in stone. It is flexible and changeable. Our conduct is always the net outcome of many contingencies, some positive and others negative. We learn from our experiences. Altering the contingencies does not alter human nature but takes advantage of human nature's plasticity.

Up to now, we have altered the contingencies in one direction only. Unable to prove the worldlyadvantages oflawfulness over undetected dishonesty, we pronounce virtue to be its own reward. Then, backed by this principle ofrighteousness, we punish anyone we catch being unrighteous. The tradition ofpunishmentbecomesevermore strongly entrenched as society makes lawbreaking more costly to the few it can detect and prosecute successfully. Even within the obvious practical constraints. mightwe moreeffectivelyencourage conformity to standards of civilized conduct by providing more frequent and stronger positive reinforcement than by threatening more severe punishment? We could be using what we know about behavior not just by punishing crime but by keeping it from happening.

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The Police: Which Side Are They On? Society's main enforcement arm is the police. Our local. state, and federal police forces are for the most part instruments ofcoercion. With some exceptions. the major duties we assign to them are to threaten counterforce against anyone who is tempted to deviate from our legal standards of peace and decency. and to apply counterforce against anyone who actually does deviate.

Government is more and more often calling on the police to support affluent and influential segments of society against people who are lesswell connected. Against a background ofpoverty. racial prejudice, and other complex social problems. police coercion in many areas is becoming more stringent and violent than it used to be. As counterviolence by the poor, the dispossessed, and the idealistic young intensifies, the police are also coming to act less selectively, tending to treat any encounterwith the public-at-large as a potential threat to their own safety. Coerced confessions havebeen sufficiently common to have concerned our Supreme Court, which continues to require police to inform suspects of their rights before questioning them.

The intensification of police coercion has been taldng place most prominently in our larger cities. where the problems that divide our society stand out most visibly. When large-city police stop young drivers for traffic violations. they automatically order them out while they inspect the car for drugs. This is a humiliating experience for manyyoungsters. Black or Hispanic drivers in a similar situation are made to assume that undignified and degrading posture that all 1V viewers know is intended to give the police the advantage in the event the "suspects" attempt to flee or to counterattack. Because some suspected lawbreakers have tried to run down the investigating officers. the police now consider cars as weapons and feel justified in shooting a driver who fails to stop when ordered.

More generally. as criminal activity has itself become more violent. police action has followed suit. The police regard the presumption of innocence not as a valued protection of the public but as a threat to their own professional effectiveness and personal safety. They would prefer the presumption of guilt as the guiding principle of law enforcement. Then. the mere suspicion of crime would justify harsh detention. arrest. and the use oftheir weapons. As our police become more and more severely coercive. ever-widening segments of the public are beginning to view them less as protectors than as shocks

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and signals for shocks-to be escaped m. avoided. and even to be treated as objects of counteraggresston

The police have only been doing · a 1e m n ofthe taxpayers have asked them to do. But like all coerc. ·e terns. this one too has generated the usual side effects. coercive pressure is causing many citizens in all economic . soci classes to fear and mistrust the police. Even in peaceful an perous sections ofthe city that demand police patrols to deter muggers. purse snatchers. car theives. and rapists who come in from neighboring areas, the local inhabitants rarely greet their protectors. converse with them. or show any sign of gratitude for their presence. The patrollees. in turn. theirwatchful eyes and suspicious expressions indicating that they regard every approaching pedestrian as a potential aggressor. arouse fear and anxiety even among those who are grateful for their presence.

The goal ofreuniting public and police is worth considerable effort. but the gulf is widening. In reaction to a community's growing mistrust, the police become ever more hostile and contemptuous toward those they are supposed to protect. The public begins to forget it needs police as protection: the police begin to forget they are supposed to be protectors. Counteraggression against police is spreading to other uniformed protectors: firemen in some quarters are no longer surprised to find themselves being taunted and stoned while performing their duties-for certain, a bit of social pathology rather than a common occurrence. but one that springs directly from coercive interactions between police and public. It is even possible that the high incidence of police suicide is traceable at least in part to the growing discrepancy between policepersons' perception of their duty to the public and the public's lack ofappreciation for their commitment.

The low esteem for the police in many communities also deters countless young and able people from entering that career. As a consequence, many who do choose law enforcement are hardly distinguishable from those who cross to the r side. With each side dependent on coercion to achieve the police and their opponents become more and more

In most third-world countries. p and brutality are already taken for granted. We can see a similar trend in the highly developed nations of E "..,nited States, police dependence on coercion is less evtden communities than

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in the cities. Urban police are coming to direct their energies less toward protection of the citizenry and more toward guarding themselves against public hostility. When some cities have failed to meet their demands for higher pay, the police have generated tourist­ industry support by frightening away visitors and sightseers. When members ofthe police force are themselves exposed as criminals, the union does its best to block legal prosecution. They oppose and hinder investigations of alcohol and other drug abuse within their own ranks, of bribei:y and other easy forms of corruption, and of cheating in promotion exams.

Allowed to continue, this increasing separation may well come to its climaxwhen the police throw their lot inwith a political leaderwho promises to raise them from their position as servants of the public and, instead, to put them in charge. The public will then find itself without any protection. This process may already have begun in the United States presidential campaign of 1988, when both candidates actively courted the support of police organizations. Ironically, the first police group to support a candidate publicly was the vety one that had frightened tourists in the airport in Boston.

Can we counteract this reversal of the police function? The police will probably never be able completely to shed their coercive image, but might a greater use of positive reinforcement help them tip the balance back toward its original state? It will not be easy. Today's police are not likely to accept a change in their role from coercers to positive reinforcers, even ifwejustadded positive techniques to their armamentariumwithout taking away their coercive powers. Coercion is, after all, familiar and comfortable. With the source oftheir power hanging from their belt, they are protected against counterattack. Why put out the extra effort to learn new methods of control­ whether over traffic or over crime-just because they might reduce hostility? Would the methods even work? Eveiybody knows "good guys come in last." As long as they carty a gun, all other possible forms of control become insignificant.

The ultimate coercer is the gun. the taker of life. Even sheathed, guns are threats, and anyone canytng a gun is a threat. No matter how much positive reinforcement you hand out, a gun at your side tells evei:yone to keep in line-or else. Can the police ever shed their coercive image while they continue to carry guns? Probably not.

And yet, with guns generally available, stripping police of their weapons would place them at tremendous risk. We cannot remove

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their backup coercers while leaving them open to that same coercion by others. Perhaps a start could be made by changing a few of the traditional conceptions thatunderlie policework. For example, every policeperson is supposed to be ready to perform all duties at all times. Could we not partitionpoliceresponsibilities? Guns are surely not necessary for directing traffic. Vhen that job is assigned, could it not be made their sole respons. . -'? Then, if a nearby bank was being robbed or a pedestrian m~. they would not be required to intervene. Similarly, police working at desk jobs, particularly those who come into contact with e ublic. could be given limited enforcement responsiblllttes. 1:-: _· . would need no guns. And when they investigate crimes tha ·e already been committed- housebreaks, arson, even mur er-m s · e.,Tcanygunswhilethey examine the scene and questio u: • :mants? Police uniforms might even vary, depending on the c. rrero · assJ.gDment. The public would soon learn the meanings .. ar. us uniforms and what to expect-and not to expect- — · e wearers of each.

Most duties do not place e · e at risk and most of the public is, after all, law abiding. Dispe __ i • their guns while on routine duties would help emphasize :…..e S(;~ice functions that most often bring the police into contac· … e general public and would deemphasize their coerch ~-e .- small step, to be sure, but a beginning. Even though e · e olice power remained coercive, a reduction ofthe potential l r e~ e might help stem the growing adversarial relationship be ·ee"" …. e and public. A small amount ofpolice disarmamen~ restti · e a :rrs to safeduties and continuing only after ..bugs" in the n – – ~ tern have been discovered and eliminated, would be a step u. · e !:igh direction. Given the general desirability of reducing the uency and force of the coercive pressures in our society. a social experimentation does not seem out of line.

Might it be possible eventuall: have a police force that is almost weaponless? Given the current practicalities, that is not likely. Still, those practicalities areworth examining in the light ofthe advantages that might accrue ifwe could some owgetaround them. Gun control has to be a two-way street. Before they can be taken from the police, guns must first be taken from everybody else. But pressure groups have lobbied successfully against laws that would regulate the private possession of firearms. This is a complex issue, with much more at stake thanjustpolice coercion. Butthe increasing frequency

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and ferocity of that coercion, and the resulting deterioration of the relationship between the protectors and the protected, have not usuallybeen considered in the debate overgun control. Reducing the private ownership ofweapons could also reduce the need for public safety officers to relyonweapons in carryingout their responsibilities.

Once violence against the policehas occurred, we cannotreasonably expect them to "tum the other cheek" and respond with nonviolence. And in tum, it is difficult to conceive of noncoercive measures for making weapons unavailable to everyone else and thereby to reduce the likelihood of violence against the police. Could we perhaps give substantial rewards to people who turn in their guns? We might also allow people to own guns but require them to be stored with the police, who might then make their firing ranges available. These and similar measures are probably worth trying even if, as seems likely, they do not succeed completely. Although most who turn in their guns would never have become involved violently with the police anyway, some opportunities for confrontation will have been eliminated. But the reinforcers for owning guns are frequently negative-protection of self and property-and for many, no positive reinforcers will outweigh these. And, of course, we have those whose '"business" is violence against society-those who need guns to back up their coercive practices.

To deal with the hard core-those mostly law-abiding citizens who will insist on holding on to their weapons for self-protection and those who use them as items of "business equipment"-it may well be necessary to institute some new coercive measures ourselves. A certain amount of "preventive coercion" might be necessary to disarm enough of the population to make it feasible for police to perform most of their duties unarmed.

In order to help keep the police from having to respond to force with force of their own, our laws may have to specify severe penalties not just for the ownership of lethal weapons but for their possession in the vicinity of law enforcement personnel. Then, merely possessing a gun in the presence of a policeperson could bring nearly the same penalty that would have followed the actual use of the gun.

Such a law, although severely coercive itself, might finally permit police to abandon their guns in safety. This might leave room for them to use positive reinforcement to build lawful conduct, instead ofjust punishing those who break the law. The result could be a net reduction of coercive control. Without guns-and, of course, with

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adequate security against the use of guns by others-it would be possible for the profession oflawenforeementto recruityoung people who were not already committed to violence and retribution as a way of life. The absence ofguns could help reduce the public perception that the police are to be feared by everyone, and to reduce the extent to which the police hold that coercive image of themselves. Could that coercive self-image be responsible for the finding that police officers are twice as likely to kill themselves as to be killed by a crtminal?

Again, social experimentation will be necessary. We know that coercion is self-defeating but practical substitutes need careful appraisal. Positive reinforcementdoes notworkbymagic. I tis simple in principle but often difficult to engineer. Our appraisal ofpositive reinforcement techniques should begin before the subversion ofthe police function has become irreversible.

Could local and state police help reestablish friendship with their communities by dispensing positive reinforcement? Just as the givers of shocks become shocks themselves, the givers of positive reinforcers become positive reinforcers themselves. Athletic leagues sponsored by police are existing examples of attempts to prevent delinquency by reinforcing desirable conduct instead ofjustwaiting for problems to occur and then striking hard. Such cooperation between police and community would seem eminently reasonable even if we knew nothing about behavior analysis, but data on the effectiveness of the practice are lacking. We need to know if it succeeds and if not, why it fails. Modifications might then bring increasing success, perhaps even generating extensions of police sponsorship into science fairs, agricultural shows, cooking and baking competitions, and other educationally relevant activities for young people.

Are there otherareas inwhich the policemight try to tip the balance from negative to positive control? Now, they hand out penalty tickets to motorists whom they catch speeding, passing through a red light or stop sign, driving without a seat belt. canying children without a safety seat, or having defective headlights and signals. What would happen if, instead, they ·caught9 drivers obeying the speed limit, stopping at a red light or stop sign. wearing a seat belt, carrying a child in a safe car seat, orhaving fully functional lights-and handed out free tickets to sporting events. movies, plays, concerts, and museums?

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This reversal of typical police practice might not prove as wildly impractical as itmay seem at first. Itwould not require them to annoy drivers bystopping themwhen theywere in a hurryto get somewhere; the reinforcer could be given while the driver was stopped at a light or a toll booth, or the officer could take the license number and a computer could quickly find the address and mail the reinforcer there. Even better, the officer could deliver it to the address in person. Nor would it be necessary to hand out positive reinforcers to all or even to most drivers who obey the law. Reinforcers given occasionally have been found to maintain behavior-once it has been learned­ even more effectively than reinforcers given for evecy occurrence of the desired conduct (a counterintuitive fact that has been quite thoroughly documented).

In other areas of police responsibility, too, positive reinforcement might help them achieve their objectives. In crowd control-at parades, sporting events, and demonstrations of various types­ instead ofjustwaiting to push people back when they get out ofline, could the police occasionally hand out reinforcers for staying within the marked boundaries? Could we ask them not just to prevent looting at scenes offlood or fire but to help provide food, clothing, and shelter for those in need? At the voting booth, instead of just disqualifying people who are not listed, could they occasionally give something extra to people whose names they do find?

Although positive reinforcement is nota traditional police function, it is not hard to come up with new possibilities once one has become accustomed to thinking that way. Individual instances would undoubtedly run into practical difficulties, but if one maintains the experimental attitude, then one abandons unsuccessful practices · or, better, modifies them until they do work. We have good reason to believe that reinforcement for keeping within the law would work in many instances as effectively as the current system ofwaiting until the law is broken and then punishing. We have precedent for the beliefthat positive reinforcementfor desirable conductwould reduce the necessity ofpunishment for undesirable actions. Evidence ofthe power of positive contingencies is strong enough to warrant some real social experiments along these lines, starting small but aiming high.

Equally important would be the side effects-this time, side effects of positive reinforcement. Police cars would signal not fear and apprehensionbutanticipation offriendly and rewarding encounters,

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welcome signs that everything is all right. As dispensers of positive reinforcement, the police ·ould generatenotavoidance butapproach, not fear but cheer. not hos~ . – b friendliness. We might see at

reestablishment of public ……..:· an confidence in our protective institutions. The public "" · · .e police as adversaries would disappear; they would ree · ~ ·:ed. respected, and trusted.

Mightwe also establish a · rcement system thatworks in the other direction? C ~ re effectively show our appreciation for police se~-: — ~g visible and valuable consequences contingerr _…onnance? If we did. we would be more likely to see e again.

Currently, we take noti ~……. when we detect deviations from acceptab e 1ft to punish. Instead ofjust reacting e conduct, we could also reinforce them like. How about individual citations, extra _ owardpromotion? We would, of course. ha,·e · . A valid system would probably require grea· e are accustomed to in describing what we cons uct. Generalities like outstanding hones~-. not suffice. Such vague specifications leave t tnuy. capricious. and even fraudulent Judgme to describe what police officers actually have : loyalty, integrity, or whatel . . system from becoming com.:

It would be simplistic. o · ~tu-se. reinforcementas a cure-all public and police. Law entor<:eu1er.c.1 !"#·——~ large-scale economicand po&£~ have little control. We have ~ ..forces" may discourageusfro Only the physical sciences de· In the social sciences, the~ mt:2ns all too often serving Just variables.

Law enforcement is a social .. and among people. Behavtoia ~.-n"!:lT,l~n,,,p;;::

And reinforcement. positive an…. ::~tatn~ factors that determinewhat · to attribute to "social forces. – ·

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determined at least in part by reinforcement variables. To the extent that a reduction of police reliance on weapons to enforce coercive practices can help bring relationships between police and public under the control ofpositive reinforcers, to the extent that the police can use positive reinforcement instead ofcoercion to accomplish the task we have assigned them of controlling our own behavior, and to the extent that we can generate and maintain desirable police conductbyproviding positive reinforcement, the "forces" that influence the relationship between police and public will have been weighted somewhat less on the side of aversion and counteraggression, and more on the side of mutual respect and cooperation.

Positive Reinforcement in Diplomacy

Doves and Hawks. We on the sidelines know little about what actually goes onduringdiplomatic negotiations. Militaryand economic resources-potential reinforcers-are enlisted in the service offoreign policy through mysterious routes. The secrecy makes the diplomatic process hard to analyze. But there is no mystecy about the results. By maintaining that war is a viable alternative to peace, standard diplomacy has spawned a system of intimidation, belligerence, and murderous aggression that functions to satisfy economic greed and lust for power.

Because power, resources, and prestige are potent reinforcers, nations will probably always have to keep militacy forces to forestall those who would take everything for themselves. "Hawks" advocate an increasingly aggressive posture, backed up by an irresistible militacy establishment. They argue that readiness to attack is self­ protective and insist that only superior force can protect a nation against attack. "Doves," who advocate international friendship, argue that threatened aggression generates counteraggression and insist that onlydisarmamentwill guarantee peace. The doves accuse the hawks of causing rather than preventing wars, and the hawks accuse the doves of unrealism, of just asking for self-destruction.

Certainly, no country can close its eyes to the possibility of attack by another and yet, the notion of superior force has itself become unrealistic; several nations now have enough nuclear explosives to destroy evecyone. Is it really impractical to attempt to influence other nations noncoercively? The dove-and-hawk analogy has a curious

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twist. To be eitherkind ofbird is equallynatural and both have value. but doves appear to be smvivors while hawks have become an endangered species.

Positive reinforcement. although it does not generate the enmity and counteraggresston that comes in the wake of coercion, is nevertheless a contingency. It does not mean giving everything away for nothing. To be effective, positive reinforcers must be contingent on conduct and on the circumstances in which the conduct takes place. Although not coercive unless misuse transforms it into negative reinforcement, positive reinforcement is still behavioral control.

As we have seen, nonconttngent giving is a form ofcontrol also, and can be destructive, generating behavior that is in nobody's best interest. Giving unconditionally is not the opposite of coercion. If parents give children everything they want regardless of how they act, the children will learn nothing useful to them, to their parents, or to society in general. One nation giving another everything itwants regardless of what it does will not get the recipient to function productively or peacefully in the world society. Noncontlngent giving does not signify generosity. It produces its own destructive side effects.

On the other side, the avoidance paradox (Chapter 9) will prevent any coercive peace-keeping policy from succeeding completely; nobody can continue avoiding forever without receiving an occasional shock. Nuclear deterrence suffers a special disadvantage. When the inevitable shock comes, it will put an end to all human conduct. For that reason, a workable policy of mutual deterrence would require the restriction ofarmaments to less destructive weapons. Even with a peace that we maintain through mutual deterrence, nuclear disarmamentwould be necessary. An occasional armed conflict that does not wipe everyone out might then setve as the necessary reminder that keeps us avoiding more wars for a while.

Although we can probably never completely eliminate coercion from diplomatic policy, we cannotdependonitas the keypeacekeeping mechanism. At most, we should keep itonlyfor emergencies. As with families, a strong background ofpositive reinforcement can prevent an occasional use of force from producing devastating side effects. But again and again we have seen predominantly coercive control sooner or later producing the veiy counte:rviolence it was intended to prevent.

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Hungry Generals. Military establishments preempt and use up a huge portion of the world's wealth, transforming it mainly into consumable supplies and weapons. Military organizations produce no food or shelter except for themselves. manufacture no goods for civilian use. provide health care only for their own, set up schools almost solely for education in the methods and technology of warfare, and establish research laboratories to discover new ways and to refine old ways of destroying potential adversaries. Only a miniscule portion of the military budget goes for the production of generallyusefulgoods, technology, knowledge, or education. Most of the resources it appropriates go to waste. In wartime, human lives go down the drain. In peacetime, all weapons eventually bum, explode, or rot.

The world could reduce this wastage enormously by reducing the size of its military establishments. Wealthy and powerful nations might find it possible to scale down their forces safely by substituting positive reinforcement for the coercion that currently passes as diplomacy. International coercion, ipso facto, requires a military backup; retaliation is inevitable. We support coercive diplomacy by building up militruy forces, producing a still greater wastage of human and material resources. That cycle could be broken by replacing coercion with positive reinforcement as an instrument for maintaining civilized interactions among nations. Eliminating the need to sustain increasingly voracious military organizations would make a significantly larger pool of basic necessities and other resources available for all. To be sure, the mere availability of resources does not mean they will be distributed fairly or in a spirit of international cooperation but it would at least open up a possibil­ ity. Contingent sharing would then lessen nations' need to resort to aggression and counteraggression.

Good Neighbors? Because the stakes are so high, preliminary experimentation is desirable, although diplomacy that is based on empirical data has hardly been a tradition anywhere. Might it make sense for the State Department to establish a research arm that included, among others, behavior analysts and experts in scientific methodology? These "foreign-service scientists" could initiate experimental studies, someperhapsaskingwhetherouraccumulating knowledge about behavior might be applied in the service of international peace.

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The objectives ofdiplomacy are behavioral. Theiraim ts to influence the conductofthosewhogovern othernations. Instead ofattempting to destroy an unfriendlygovernment by supporting internal violence and terrortsm-