Bye-bye Britain? Devolution and the United Kingdom

Juliet Berger

SAIS Review, Volume 20, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2000, pp. 145-157 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/sais.2000.0031

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Juliet Berger received her MA with a concentration in European Studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS in May 2000.

Recent changes to the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom have the potential to profoundly alter Great Britain’s

future. A signal development is the 1999 signing of the Belfast Agreement, which re-established a devolved parliament in Northern Ireland. Together with the new Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, this accord is a milestone in the process of decentralizing the British state. In his campaign for election as prime minister, New Labour leader Tony Blair boldly promised to create regional governments for Britain. The constitutional changes enacted under his leadership now suggest the outlines of a federal state. Taken together, the new Scottish and Welsh institutions, the hard-fought settlement in Northern Ireland, fledgling development authorities for the English regions, and an elected mayor for London, all point in this direction. While the process has thus far been orchestrated by the governing Labour Party, there is also a possibility that national independence movements could split the country into separate nations, or into a confederation of semi-sovereign nations.

The changing balance of power in the British Isles is particularly significant when viewed within the context of the European Union. Traditionally a highly centralized state, Britain has thus far resisted the process of European integration. Now, however, it may be transforming itself into a more typically European actor: as a federal state with a plurality of regional interests, or as a British Isles confederation of sovereign states, the United Kingdom may more willingly and fully integrate into the European Union. This

Bye-bye Britain? Devolution and the United Kingdom

Juliet Berger

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paper discusses the historical, economic, and political factors that will influence the outcome.

Northern Ireland: Elements of the Problem

The recent devolution of power to Northern Ireland, if successful, marks the end of the longest chapter in Britain’s colonial history. Britain has embraced the Belfast Agreement as a welcome avenue of disengagement from Irish commitments stemming from its earliest acts of colonization.1

English presence in Ireland dates back at least to the twelfth century, when competing Irish clans first perceived the English settlers as a threat to their own territorial aspirations. A limited English presence continued around Dublin for the next four centuries, until military expeditions during the reign of Queen Elizabeth extended English control to most of the island. The Catholic clans of the northern province of Ulster held out against the English armies until the colonists’ ascendancy was finally established in 1690 at the Battle of the Boyne, which has remained a Protestant and Unionist rallying cry ever since. The “Irish problem” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries thus finds its roots in the seventeenth century Plantation of Ulster, a state-sponsored program of colonization that confiscated land from the conquered Irish and granted it to settlers from Scotland and England, most of whom where Protestant. Thus began an uneasy and unequal cohabitation of communities who perceived their differences in religious, cultural, and territorial terms.2

The United Kingdom came into existence in 1801, just after the 1800 Act of Union that bound Ireland to Britain and abolished the Irish Parliament and government. Scotland had been drawn into the fold almost a century before. Scottish union deprived Scotland of its independence and parliament in 1707, but brought significant commercial advantages from membership in the mercantilist empire system while leaving the institutions of Scottish law and religion intact. These institutions later provided the basis for a cohesive Scottish nationalist movement in the twentieth century.

Rising Irish nationalism in the nineteenth century made Ireland an obstreperous member of the United Kingdom. Public debate revolved around the need to pacify increasing tensions. One popular and controversial solution was Home Rule, which had an advocate at the highest level in Liberal Prime Minister William

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Gladstone. His vision for Ireland was one of a united Ireland enjoying Home Rule within the United Kingdom.3 Correspondingly, he viewed Ulster’s Protestants not as a majority within the North, but as a minority population of the island as a whole.

Because of Ulster’s desire to be directly governed by Westminster, the creation of a Home Rule administration for Ireland was more complex than the classic case, where devolution is a political response to a separatist threat. Historian Vernon Bogdanor argues that while administrative autonomy is generally granted to meet the demands of a nationalist or separatist movement, as in Catalonia or Quebec, this was only partly true with Home Rule in Ireland.4 Westminster in fact wished to free itself from its governmental responsibilities in quarrelsome Ireland, and to this end legislated the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. This established two Home Rule parliaments, one in Dublin and one in Belfast.

Ulster’s Protestant Unionists initially opposed Home Rule for any part of Ireland, but as Westminster’s intentions became clear, they ultimately came to see Home Rule as a way of preserving their ties to Britain. Desperately wanting to be governed by the British, they accepted a devolved parliament because they recognized in it the safeguard of being able to veto any attempt by Westminster to abandon the province.5 Meanwhile, since Westminster hoped to divest itself entirely of involvement in Irish affairs, the partition of Ireland through the 1920 Act was considered by its English sponsors as an interim measure, to be remedied through the agency of a Council of Ireland.6 This body would be authorized to re-unify the island by mutual agreement of the two partitioned regions, without any help or action on the part of the “Imperial Parliament” (Westminster).

However, the Unionists clung to their claim of British citizenship, using the principle of self-determination to argue that Ulster’s six predominantly Protestant counties should remain part of the United Kingdom. Elsewhere in Ireland, however, the notion of self-determination rested on nationalist sentiment and fueled the separatist movement. Devolution of power did not satisfy the nationalist Sinn Féin party, which continued the struggle for independence, finally secured by the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty establishing the Irish Free State. Thus, while centrifugal forces usually inspire a devolution of power, in this case it was the centripetal force of Unionism that resulted in Home Rule for Ulster, instead of for the secessionist Dublin Irish, for whom it was

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originally intended. Bogdanor points out that the lengthy title of the 1920 Act “for the better government of Ireland” was in fact a misnomer, as the Home Rule parliaments imposed on both North and South were wanted by neither (albeit for fundamentally different reasons).7 Home Rule thus failed to satisfy any of the major actors: the Irish nationalists demanded full independence; the British government retained obligations in Northern Ireland; and the northern Unionists were thwarted in their desire for full incorporation into the United Kingdom.

Nationalism and Economy

A 1999 Economist article that analyzes the meaning of the Union Jack concludes that the superimposition of the crosses of Saints George, Andrew, and Patrick (the patron saints of England, Scotland, and Ireland, respectively), “reminds Britons that they are not so much a nation, and certainly not an ethnic nation, as a political union of separate nations.”8 An analysis of the politics of identity in the Financial Times further distinguishes between the positive phenomenon of patriotism in Britain’s national communities, and the harmful perversions of nationalism, as witnessed in the Balkans. The article applauds the Scots for rooting their confident enthusiasm for self-governance in shared history, institutions, and values, rather than in a defensive and mean-spirited exclusiveness.9 However, the author’s point is well taken: Britain has had its own recent episodes of internecine violence. One need only look as far as Brixton and Toxteth, Belfast and Londonderry, and the traveling soccer wars of alienated hooligans to see potential for communal violence in British society.

The belief that economic underdevelopment and poverty cause social unrest and violence finds expression in the institutions of social democracy in continental Europe. In contrast to the Anglo- Saxon liberal-individualist model, continental European social philosophy places emphasis on protecting the less-skilled sectors of the work force from falling into poverty because of unemployment. Overall social justice and cohesion are primary goals, as evidenced by the European Union’s establishment of structural and cohesion funds.

Although Great Britain has elements of a welfare state, it is also the birthplace of liberalism and has a tradition of laissez-faire labor policies. There are large and growing regional disparities in

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unemployment rates and living standards. The standard of living in Northern Ireland was and is one of the lowest in the United Kingdom. Alienated workers—either unemployed or low-skilled— must have been among the best recruits for paramilitary groups involved in the sectarian conflict.

A quick look at the economic indicators reveals the economic gulf that now separates Northern Ireland from the Irish Republic to its south. Among UK regions, Northern Ireland has one of the highest unemployment rates (the others are the northeast of England, Scotland, and London). The Irish Republic has done so well that even the long-term unemployed are able to find work, and the economy is essentially running at full employment. This is a reversal from the early 1990s, when long-term unemployment was a pressing problem in Ireland.10

Economic success has transformed the outlook of the country, as Irish who once sought a better life elsewhere now see reason to return home, turning Ireland into a country of net immigration. A recent Financial Times survey of Ireland put it bluntly: “The inward-looking parochial mindset of the past has been replaced by a self-confident cosmo- politanism which started to question the pillars of authority, particularly the Roman Catholic Church.” High levels of education are now standard, with 80 percent of high school graduates going on to university.11 These are important trends, given the historical role of religion in defining Irish identity, and the closed-mindedness that characterizes violent nationalism in general.

One can hardly imagine the continuation of virulent sectarian sentiment in Northern Ireland if it were as economically dynamic as the Irish Republic. Education (ex-IRA man Martin McGuinness’ crucial new portfolio) is a key, of course, as is the laicization of society and politics that frequently accompanies economic success. In this light, a little bit of globalization might not be a bad thing for Ulster. Mo Mowlam, Labour’s Secretary of State for Northern Ireland during much of the negotiation of the current settlement, toured the United States to promote business investment in Northern Ireland “because if young people on both sides have jobs, the peace will have a better chance of working.”12

Thus, one of the best things Westminster can do for Northern

The process of d e v o l u t i o n introduced by Tony Blair is taking on a life of its own.

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Ireland is to implement the economic development program that is part of the Good Friday accords. This is important because the perception of being at an economic disadvantage would only rekindle the fire of separatism advocated by the republican movement, putting pressure on the still-fragile peace settlement. Already Ulster must see the booming economy to its south and envy its neighbor’s prosperity.

Devolution and Economy

The devolution of power to the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont in 1920 led to a lack of political accountability that exacerbated the sectarian divide in the province. Bogdanor argues that, until the re-imposition of direct rule in 1969, the devolved Parliament in fact functioned more as a federal entity with respect to Westminster than as a subordinate one.13 This was due to Westminster’s laissez-faire policies, unfamiliarity with and disinterest in Northern Ireland, and the failure of constitutional safeguards designed to prevent discrimination against the Catholic minority. The political marginalization of the province’s Catholics was institutionalized when Unionists consolidated their strength in the Stormont Parliament through a self-legislated change in the electoral system: proportional representation (PR), which safeguards an electoral voice for minorities, gave way to a first-past-the-post system. Similar abuses of power for sectarian purposes occurred through the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries, the allocation of housing, and employment practices. Westminster’s failure to address these civil rights violations was, in large part, responsible for the deterioration of inter-communal relations culminating in the period of intense violence known as the Troubles.14

The autonomy in policymaking enjoyed by the first Stormont Parliament allowed it to bypass central bureaucracy and implement creative solutions to the problems of outdated industrial structures and high regional unemployment—problems shared by the declining industrial regions of England and Scotland. Measures taken included subsidizing factory operating costs in areas of high unemployment, surveying industry labor needs in order to develop targeted training programs, and encouraging industrial diversification in a way that catered to the existing skills of the labor force. In the 1960s, these policies actually led to slightly higher growth rates for personal income in Northern Ireland than in the

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other economically depressed regions.15 Economic growth fostered the development of a Catholic middle class. While accepting its status as part of the United Kingdom, this group demanded equal rights, giving rise to the Catholic Civil Rights movement that sparked the Troubles in 1969.

Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and…England Next?

The ability of regional government to implement locally adapted economic renewal measures is the rationale behind Tony Blair’s regional initiatives in England. Along with Northern Ireland and Scotland, the northeast of England has Britain’s highest unemployment and mortality rates, and lowest disposable income per capita. In response, the government in 1999 established eight non- elected regional development agencies charged with addressing the problem of economic stagnation, especially in the old industrial regions of England that were particularly hard hit by the decline of manufacturing. Decentralization can thus be interpreted as a responsible and flexible government initiative to help the polity adjust to changing economic circumstances.

New Labour’s keen interest in the North-East’s revitalization is not surprising, because the region is a stronghold of New Labour support, and boasts the home constituencies of Tony Blair and several other cabinet members. In addition, the North-South divide in the English economy raises thorny issues about the outdated system for revenue transfers to the regions, since Scotland receives more public spending per capita than the less prosperous North-East of England.16 Increasing public spending in England by cutting it in Scotland, however, risks incensing the very Scottish separatists that Scottish devolution was intended to pacify.17

In April 1999, a self-appointed Northeast Constitutional Convention—modeled on the Scottish Constitutional Convention that met a decade ago—convened with no less a goal than to set in motion the movement towards real regional government. Similar grass-roots campaigns are underway in the English regions of Yorkshire and West Midlands.18 This underscores the possibility that the regional development authorities may yet evolve into English regional assemblies in emulation of the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

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Devolution and New Labour

The process of devolution introduced by Tony Blair is taking on a life of its own. The New Labour government revived old Labour’s pledge to support devolution if it was popularly demanded. In 1998 referenda, devolution was approved overwhelmingly in Scotland, and marginally in Wales. To ensure the representation of minorities, a PR electoral system supplanted traditional first-past-the-post voting in these two regions. It was hoped that the establishment of a devolved parliament in Scotland would neutralize the separatist campaign of the Scottish National Party through Labour-inspired self- government. What is now evident is the extent to which devolution could undermine Labour’s power base.

Although both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly are dominated by Labour, the elections were closely contested, especially in the Scottish case. The Scottish National Party (SNP) made such a strong showing as the principal opposition party that Labour failed to win a governing majority and was forced to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Labour has traditionally relied on Scottish voters returning Labour members of Parliament to Westminster: Scottish support has provided Labour with its crucial majority margin in all but two of the general elections it has won since 1945. The SNP’s unexpected strength on the left of the political spectrum undermines New Labour’s electoral votes in traditional constituencies: cities, public housing projects, trade unions, and municipal employees.19 To reduce the challenge to its majority, the government conveniently will postpone the necessary reduction in the number of Scottish constituencies until after the next elections.20

The newly devolved regional governments alter the dynamics of British politics, raising several concerns for the Labour Party. First, Blair’s centrist policies have not been entirely palatable to Scottish Labour, which has a strong tradition as a leftist party. Although Blair has, by dint of great effort, managed to unify most of his party behind the Third Way program, the peripheral offices of the party have kept their leftist leanings. The left wing of the party may thus establish a separate power base in Scotland, Wales, or London.21

Second, the continuing success of the SNP and its status as parliamentary opposition in Scotland means that an alternance of power will eventually lead to an SNP government, and presumably then to a referendum question on independence. Lastly, Blair’s

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attempts to maintain close control over the devolved institutions by promoting hand-picked Labour candidates have been foiled by devolution’s more independent political dynamics. For example, Blair initially countered Welsh Labour’s 1998 attempt to install iconoclastic candidate Rhodri Morgan as Welsh party leader and First Secretary of the Assembly. However, Blair’s protege Alun Michael ceded the post to Morgan earlier this year, pending a vote of no confidence provoked by dissatisfaction over implementation of an EU funding program. In London, “Red Ken” Livingstone’s re-election as Mayor attests to popular disapproval of Blair’s attempts to micromanage both the Labour Party and the devolution process.

Must the United Kingdom Dissolve to Fully Integrate Itself into the EU?

The European Union is a key actor in both the story of devolution in Northern Ireland and the debate over decentralization in Britain as a whole. In an article entitled “Undoing Britain,” the Economist notes that “[for] a state that has been highly centralized, [Great Britain] is passing power downward (to regions and nations such as Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), sideways (to the Bank of England, which has been given freedom to set monetary policy) and upward (to the European Union).” In turn, this dynamic of regional decentralization in the United Kingdom, coinciding as it does with national boundaries, takes on extra significance when viewed in the context of the European Union. The existence of the European Union reduces the need for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland to cling to the supranational framework of the United Kingdom.

The federalism of the European Union, though based on nations, nonetheless emphasizes the principle of subsidiarity and the importance of regions, which have their own consultative body called the Committee of the Regions (COR). In discussing the origins and role of the COR, Desmond Dinan notes that its establishment by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was “vexing” for Britain, then under Conservative government.22 Because of Britain’s high degree of centralization, there were no institutionally separate representatives of the country’s constituent nations (England, Scotland, and Wales), who would most obviously have represented Britain’s regions at the COR. True to form, the government used the occasion to try to buy off regional nationalists by over-representing Scotland and Wales within Britain’s centrally-composed COR delegation.

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Britain’s constitutional structure has long legitimized a high concentration of power in a sovereign parliament, making it hard for Britain to accept the power-sharing principle on which the continental European Union is built.23 However, within the EU system, the United Kingdom cannot claim to have any more or less national or parliamentary sovereignty than any other nation. Britain may become more amenable to integration within the EU as Blair’s constitutional restructuring continues, and as the EU itself evolves. First, Britain will probably come to resemble most of the large continental states, which decentralize power through a federal or quasi-federal governmental structure. Second, although the EU was the epitome of power-sharing when the European Commission was

small enough to allow all decisions to be made consensually, the move to qualified majority voting could allow room for coalition-building among states with similar interests—such as Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Should the constituent nations of the United Kingdom split apart and seek independent membership in the European Union, they would find themselves among like-minded and similarly-sized states. EU membership is attractive to small states because it provides them disproportionate

influence, while solving the problems of defense, currency, external trade, and market access, which would otherwise prohibit a country like Scotland from standing alone. Indeed, considerations such as these originally motivated Scotland to unite with England in 1707.24

The nations of the UK already have a political and economic relationship with Europe. While the COR is a purely consultative body, UK regional politicians deal directly with the EU in applying for special program funds. One such fund, the Cohesion Fund, was established to help reduce disparities among Europe’s regions and different social groups. Membership in the EU has proved extremely beneficial for the Republic of Ireland since it joined the European Community in 1973: EU structural and cohesion funds were fundamental to the acceleration of Ireland’s economic growth. With annual growth rates well above 5 percent, Ireland’s per capita GDP rose from 63.6 percent of the EU average in 1983 to 89.9 percent in

The existence of the EU reduces the need for Scotland, Wales, and Northen Ireland to cling to the United Kingdom.

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1995. The EU also had a little publicized role in helping to bring

about the peace settlement in Northern Ireland. The Commission established a Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation that distributed £400 million over five years in the form of 11,000 grants for cross-community initiatives in the province.25

Although the structural and cohesion funds have been successful in helping to close the North-South gap within Europe, a 1996 European Commission report singled out Britain as one country where the gap between rich and poor regions is growing.26

Looking at the Irish success story, one can see how attractive direct membership in the EU must seem to the British regions.

The Belfast Agreement

Two new institutions created by the Good Friday accords reflect the changes afoot in the British Isles. The North-South Council is intended to provide a forum for consultation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on matters of pan-insular concern. Although not intended to encourage reunification, the North-South Council should result in closer and more amicable relations between Belfast and Dublin. In this sense, it will further an almost Gladstonian state of affairs when viewed with its counterpart, the British-Irish Council.27

The British-Irish Council, or East-West Council, has also been dubbed the “Council of the Isles” because of its all-inclusive character (representatives come from the UK and Irish governments; the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man). It is a purely consultative body, but its membership corresponds roughly to Gladstone’s conception of a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—a community of separate national entities closely tied by common interests. Notably, England is the only nation not expressly represented. Since the devolved national parliaments will send their own ministers, it is likely that the UK delegation will speak on behalf of England. Paradoxically, the British-Irish Council that was established to counterbalance the North-South Council and reassure Unionists of their membership in the United Kingdom, could instead have the centrifugal effect of underscoring the lack of a national voice for England within the UK.28 These two new institutions together encourage new relationships among the nations of the British Isles,

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establishing a new framework that de-emphasizes the importance of the traditional United Kingdom.

The Unthinkable is Certainly Possible

Will the United Kingdom evolve into a federal state? Such a future is possible, and even probable. The recent devolution of power to Wales and Scotland, and most recently to Northern Ireland, are potentially steps in this direction. In addition, in an effort to revitalize England’s economically depressed regions, Tony Blair has set in motion a process that points to regional government for England.

Whether or not the United Kingdom breaks up into separate, sovereign states is another matter. While it is a distinct possibility, circumstances have changed in ways that make the separations less urgent. Both Scotland and the Republic of Ireland are more prosperous than earlier this century—this is particularly true of Ireland. In tandem with its economic boom, Ireland has become a more secular state in the conduct of its politics, and this decline in the importance of religion as an Irish identifier has helped to defuse relations with Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

Although it renders separatism feasible by providing a context within which small states can operate, the European Union may also brake the centrifugal momentum. The stability of the EU framework could slow the process of regional devolution so that instead of culminating in separate states, it arrives at a confederal status quo of semi-sovereign states. This would perhaps provide the advantages of a British Isles identity as well as an individual voice within the European Union.

Each of these scenarios is possible. Yet, the devolution of power to Northern Ireland has proven only a tenuous certitude thus far. A devolved parliament is legally subordinate to the central authority, which can overrule or even suspend it. However, it is unthinkable that Westminster would revoke a Scottish parliament validated by 74.3 percent of a referendum vote. Despite the apparent trend towards federalism, the development of constitutional change in the United Kingdom and the configuration of the British Isles may yet hold a surprise or two.

Notes: 1 For example, recently declassified, thirty-year-old documents show that the government, frustrated by the growing civil strife in Northern Ireland in 1969, briefly